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Fro":j';R 'rRADE RELATIONS BETWl~EN THE UNITED STATES 
AnD CANADA 
1 
the present discussion might be called a kind o~ after-
ma.th of tho wide intereElt shown in the recent attempt at 
reciprocity between the United States and Canada. The purpose of' 
this paper is to attempt to show that freer trade relatione 
between the two oountries ase deBireo.ble and practical both 
for the Amerioans and for the Canadians. Tho sumject will 
naturally lead us into a discussion of t.he nature and extent 
of our trade with Csnada,of the question of international trade 
with its two phasas of free trade and protection,and of the 
political problems arising therefrom. Nothing but. a rather brief 
treatment of such a large subjeot can be undertaken here. Duning 
and after the campaign for reciprocity many excellent a.rticles 
on the subject appe~red in v~.lri ()U8 .c;nglish,Canad1an and 
Amerioan mugazines,ur:d mnny other articleB wr'ich were not 
excellent because they were written by men blaoed strongly in 
one direction or the othor .,;hat is attempted here is to 8i ve 
a treatment of Lhe subject whlch,although because of ito 
briefness can not be exhuustive, yet will be more complete 
than the articleD written in the heat of the car:'! pf..l.i[~n,or 
immediately after. AS a rule the articles referred# to concerned 
l~wnselveB with only one or two phnses of the Bubject,oither 
ir;norinc or minimiztn8 other phases just as important. 
I. Nature and extent of our trade with Canada. 
The firot thing we are concerned with is the nature l:Lnd 
extent of our trade with Canada. To help us understand the 
general nature of this trade let us briefly compare the two 
countrio8,ao to size, location,climate and population. 
The area of eanada is 3,745,574 square miles.This 1s as 
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large as is the Unite States with the Philipines and Hawaii. 
Al though Canada lies north of the United States/ it is not 
wholly in the frigid zone as is sometimes imagined. Its climate 
permits of a great variety of crops other than wheat; the 
southernmost pOint of Oanada 1s in the same latitude as Rome. 
The population in 1911 was 7,204,527, an increase of 34.13% 
over the n.opu1ation in 1901. ~m 1897 to 1905,643,543 immigrants 
arrived,of whom 35% were Britlsh,33% American,and 32% of other 
nationaiities. With the exception of the large nu~ber of 
French in Canada and the negroes in the United States, the 
oomposition of the population of the two countries is much the 
e ane • 
To put the matter br:te:f1y,we may say that we have as the 
-------------------------_ .. --------------------------
1. Canadian Handbook,1906,~~.1-17. 
2. Fifth Caaeus of Canada,1911,Special Report on Area and 
1-;opulation, p. v. 
3. ~noY.Br1t.JArticle ,Canada. 
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busia of' uur study,two countries of about equal extent of 
territory,both endowed with a wide ranf,e of climate,and 
adapted ~or the I*'~tproduotlon of a great variety of 
agricultural and manufactured products,lying side by side with 
boundaries touching for three thousand miles. There are 
practically no physloql ~R~rjers to separate the two peoples in 
their industrial and oo~ercial activities. Furthermore,they 
are at the same race,and,having similar conditions of natural 
environment to meet,and living under forma o~ government 
essesnt1ally identioal,have similar wants and oharaoter. 
Naturally,under these oircumstances,one would expeot to 
find 0. large trade existing between the people of the United 
States and the Canadians. There is still another reason for 
expeoting such a trnde to exist and to develop into greater 
proportions. Zhat is the topography o~ the North American 
Continent. 
" It ie somewhat remarkable that,in all the discussion 
which has taken place concerning reciprooity with Canada,no 
reter#ence has been made to the topographioal and geographical 
oonditione whioh render trade between the different parte of the 
Dominion exceeding~" costly,and trade between the various 
parts of Oanada and parts of the Un1ted States adjacent to them 
partioularly easy and ad.antageous. As an ed1torial in the 
----------------------------_. -- ----------------------------
Review ot Revlews,August,1911, Reciprocity with Canada. 
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Engineering News remarks: 
• Few peo,le realize to what extent topographical 4onditions 
divide the Canadian nation into, separate parts remote from 
each other, each of which finds its natural commercial relations 
with that part at the United States immediately south of it, 
rather thun with other portions of the Dominion.'ft 
Having now noted some of the reasnas for the existence e 
of a large trade between the two countttee ,let us examine the 
extent of that trade 1tBel~. The ~ollowlng table shows the 
trade at Oanada ,. during the fiscal year ending March 31~1910, 
with the British Empire,Germany,France,the United States,and 
total for all countrtes. The amounts inolude coin and bullion. 
The Foreign Trade of Oanada. 
Count:ttee EXp 0rts Imports Total trade 
British Empire $16f,364,091 $112,312,780 $277,678,8f-l 
Germany $ 2,601,191 ~ 7,958,284 $ 10,459,456 
France (." 2,840 ,648 $ 10,170,903 $ 12,811,551 " 
United Staten $113,150,778 $239,070,549 ~352,221,327 
Total $301,358,529 $391,852,692 ~893,211,221 
From these figures it is seen that 51% of Canada's 
foreign trade is with the United States,35.5% with the Empire 
-- __ _ ________ _ _ _ 0 _ ________________________________ _ _____________ _ 
1. Canadian Yearbook,1910,p.58. 
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and only 13.5% with the rest of the world,and that the United 
States 1s consequently a very important factor in the economic 
life of Canada. Canada ,because of its comparatively smaller 
population ,i8 of les8 importance to the United States. But 
our trade of ~362,221,327 wit~ur northern neighbor in the 
fiscal year of 1909-10 waB better than 10% of our total 
foreign trade for that year. 
This great trade of ours with @anada is not a temporary 
thing of mushroom growth, but represents a permanent trade which 
has had a gradual and solid development. Of the total exports 
from Canada in *'*f ~orty-three years, Great Britain received 
52.7%,the United States 36.7% and other count~~es 10.5%. 
In the Export trade of uanada the United States is gaining on 
Great Britain and wtll eventually ~ass her as she has passed 
her on the import trade. In 1875,Canada imported from Great 
Britain in round numbers,$80,OOo,ooo,and from the United 
States,$49,OOO,OOO. By 1885 the Uoiteu States led Britain 
in this trade by ft6,ooo,oOO; by 1895 she had inoreased her 
lead to $19,000,000; and by 1905 ,to $92,000,00 0. I~ 1910, 
~ 
the United States furnished 59' of Canada's imports, Great 
Britain,25%,and other countries 16%. OUr exports to Canada 
have been rapidly inoreasing in proportion to those o~ Great 
------------------------------------------------------ ------~---
1. Oanadian Yearbook,1910,pp.62-69. 
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Britain,whom we seem to be displacing in the Canadian market, 
so that whereas in 1875 the "figure f'or the United States was 
only ~ive-sixths as large as that for Britain,in 1910 it was 
more than twice as ~arge. 
II. INternational Trade. 
As we have seen above, there exists a large trade between 
the United States and Canada. We must assume that it is ~rofitable 
to both parties concerned,or it would not exist. We may ~rther 
assume that any expansion of this trade,or anything that would 
permit such an expansion would be profitable or the cause o~ 
profit. And we might expeot that the peoples of the two oount~tes 
would be busy on divices to inorease the possibilities of suoh 
a profitable trade. But instead of such activity we find,1f 
legislation can be ~ffered as eVidence, that this trade is not 
looked upon with favor, since it is being hampered by artif'icial 
restraints. We find that ~rom the standpoint of' politics,tha.t 
when John Smith of Manitoba finds it desireable to trade a 
load of wheat to William Brown of Minnesota for a oow,or a. 
plow,it 1s quite a different thing than when the same trade is 
made between John Brown of Minnesota and William Smith of 
Wisoonsin. Although the business relations of the parties 
concerned are thw same in both cases, there is a mysterious 
el~t to be r~ ~ened with fin the ~irst case whioh does not 
appear in the other. John Smith of Canada has hauled hie 
wheat and the plow received in exchange across an imaginary 
line,and by so doing has profoundly disturded the economic 
development and the political power of his country. 
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Economists have found it convenient to distinguish 
between the two CRses just oited as examples. The one is 
international trade. The other might be called intra-national 
trade. The assumption of Bastable and other economists 1s that 
in international trade certain elemnts enter in w~'" are 
not present iU other trade,or are present to a less extent, vlz., 
immobility of oapital and labor,differenoes in language,customs, 
habita, government,coinage and currency etc. International 
frade,then,is of tea oonsidered,not as trade between individuals 
of the nations,which it really is,but as trade between nations 
as a whole. Now as between the United States and Canada those 
elements o~ differneoe juct noted are so sl1ght as to be 
almost neg11gible,and if there weFe no tariff barrier, trade 
between Ontario and New Yofrk would be carried on with as 
little friotion as trade between New York and Ohio. 
But whether we consider trade between the peo,.e' of one 
country and those of another as trade between nations are 
as trade between individuals living in different communities 
such Commerce has great advantages. Mill says the advantage 
-------------~--------------------~---------~----------~-------
1. Mlll,P011tical ~conomy,p.l29 
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lies in fJ. more eff'iciont employment of the productivepowers of 
tho world. It is Virtually a doe of cheapening production, and 
in all auch CD. ses the consumer is the nerson ul tim~tely bene:ri teal. 
As a rule each nation exports those commo dltie8 for the productio~ 
of v:hlch it 1s best sulted,and obtains in return articles which 
it could not eo easily make for itself. 
Or as Bastable puts it, 11 By means of exchange a nation oba 
obtains a greater amount of satisf:';.ction, wi th a gl ven effort, or 
a given amount of sstisfaction,with a less effort,and thus 
discharges,in a better manner,its runction aA an economic 
machine." 
Another way of stating the advantages of international 
trade,or of trade between the individuals living in different 
communitles,ie to say that it means territorial division of 
labor. Terri torial division of la 'or '~ay promote economic 
welf'are in much the same way as di vision of labor in a :factory. 
Fro~ the possible gains from international trade several 
deductions must be made,because such exchange is subject to 
certain impediy-;ents. These impediments may be said to consist of 
three classes. 
I.Actual cost of carriage,s ch as shlpplng,freights,and 
------~------~-----------------. -- - ------------------- -----------
I.Mill,Political Economy,p.134. 
2.Ibid.,p.129. 
3 Bastable, Theory of International Trade,p.18. 
4. Ibid.,p .48. 
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railway charges. 
2. Brokers! and agents' commissions. 
3.Import and export dut1es,whatever their 8.im. 
The third class or imp8diments differs from the others, 
in beine round in international trade alone,although this wae 
rormerly not so. Such impediments are art1ficial,yet in 1ts 
ultimate effects,a tariff walll does not differ fro~ a mounta1n 
r ~lnge. A' lower'ng of tariff duties will encourage trade just 
as a cheaper method of transoprtat1on. A high tariff imposed 
after a mountain has been pierced by a tunnel ma.y nullify tl1e 
remova.l of the natural impediment. 
Much of the progress of the world during the last ceritury 
has been the result of improvements in the methods of transport-
ation,or the removal of natural impediments to exchange or all 
kinds. Naturally,therefore, any persons who desire to impoge 
• artiricial impediments on international trade whioh tend to 
offset the advantages derived from the removal of natural 
impedlments,ought to be required to give adequate reasons for 
doing so. The burden of proof rests upon the protectionists. 
The works of Alexander Hamilton and of Frederick List 
are classics in their reasoning in :f'u'-or of governmental 
restriction on foreign trade. 
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III. The Theory of Alexander Hamilton. 
Let us now examine the protectionist doctrine as found 
in Hamilton's celebrated report on manufactures,and note in 
how far it is applicable to the trade relations of the UnIted 
States and Canada. It Mi~ht be inferred that since the United 
States was a young nation at the time that the report was 
written,and that Cana a io now in a comnar~tively undeveloned 
conditlon,the ~H theory upon which the report is based 
would be just as applicable to Canada to-day as it was to the 
United ~tate8 a century and a quarter ago. We have all heard 
the state~ent that the nineteenth century belonged to the 
United ~tate8, but that the twentieth century is Canada's. 
Giving the matter only a casual thought,and noting that 
the-population of Oanada in 1900 was about the same as that of 
the United States in 1800, and that Canada in 1900,a8 the 
United States in 1800, possessed great bodies of unoccupied 
land and large undevel nped resources,we might suppose that there 
is a close analogy. But a second thoug :-'t will serve to convince 
us that there 1s inreality a vast difference of conditions. 
Before we pas'Qe to note t~-' is difference,however, let us 
I 
consider Hamiltons fteport in its main aspects. The Report is 
based on the two assumptions that manufacturing establishments 
are per se dssireable acquisitions for a young and developing 
nation, and that their acquisition can be greatly facilitated by 
11 
the aid of government. To SUppoDt his first assumption,he 
pOints out a number of circumstances"from which it may be 
inferred that manufacturing establishMents not only occasion a 
positive augmentation of the produce and revenue of society, 
but that they contribute essentially to rendering them greater 
than they could possibly be without such establishments." 
This thesie is no doubt sound,and it is useless ~or the 
purpose of this paper to dwe~l# upon it longer here. We are 
mainly interested in the second assumption that the acquisition 
o i manufacturing establishments can,and ought to be facilita.ted 
by governmental aotivity. Hamilton pOints out eleven ~~~"means 
by whioh promotion of manufactures has been effected in other 
countries." 
The first of these means he menitions and the one he 
o ~ choses as the mO t t expedient,is that of proteotivo duties. I 
contending that proteotive duties were desireable for the United 
~tates,he was compelled to answer two great objections. The 
first of these two objections iEl that each nation should be left 
to ~ree to produce what is is most fitted to produce. He 
a.nswered as follows: 
" The United States are,to a certain extent,in the 
Situation of a country precluded from foreign commerce.They cnn 
,indeed,without dirficulty,obtain from abroad the manufactured 
supplies of which they are 1n want, but they experience numerous 
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anci very injurious impediments to the emission and vent of their 
own commoditi os. Nor is this the case with a single ~oreign 
... 
nation only. T~ e regulations or several countries with whioh we 
havo the most extensive interc "'urse, throw serious obstructions 
in the way of the principal staples of the United States~ 
The second great objection he answered thus: 
" It is inferred that manufacturee,without the aid of 
government, wi 11 grow up as sOO '", and as fast as the natural sta.te 
0« things and the interest of the community may require. ~alnst 
the solidity of this hypothesis,in the full latitude of the teras, 
very cogent reasons may be o~fered. These have relation to the 
strong influence of habit and the spirit of imitation; the fear 
of want of success in untried enterprises; the intrinsic difficul-
ties incident to first essays toward a competition with those who 
have previouely attained to perfection in the business to be 
attempted; the bounties,pre~iums,and other artificial encoura~e­
rnents,with which foreign nations second the enterprise of their 
own citizens in the bra ches in which they are to be rivalled." 
Let us now apply Hamilton's defense of his system to 
conditions as they exist to-day between the United States and 
Canada. First,it would be absurd to say t now that the United 
States" are precluded from foreign commeroe," when that 
commerce exceeds three billion dollars annually. Therefore on 
that score the United States does not require its manufactures 
to be postered by a protective tarifr against Canada. Neither 
can it be said that Cana.da is precluded from foreign commerce, 
siuce her foreign trade in 1910 amounted to almost seven hundred 
million doll~r8. Nor is there any probability,or even ~osaibi11~y 
that she will in the ~ture experience those "injurious 
impedi ,.ents to the emission and vent" of' her commodities of' 
which Hamilton Bpoke in regard to the United States. The 
international relatione of to-day are not the international 
relatione of Hamilton's time. Nations are more inter-dependent, 
and foreign tralte is much more etable. It is especially unlikely 
that a ~ood supplying nation, such as Canada, w111 ,under any 
circumetances,be denied the Ii ~riv11ege of exporting her 
commodities. Therefore,this argument ~'r protection in the caee 
of Canada 1e no better than it ie in the case of the United 
States. 
The second argument for protection, the one re~erring to 
the necessity of government a1d to o.ercome the inertia resulti8g 
fro :"!'! the strong influence of hablt,the fea.r of want of success 
in untried enterprises, the intrinsic di~ficulties * incident to 
first essays in compet1tion with those who have previously 
attained to perfect1on,etc.,rests on amore permanent baees,and 
holds good. to Borne exrent to-day. But it by no merons so strong 
as it was a century and more ago. Habit in industry no longer 
holds the sway if did in other centuries. Labor and ca~ital are 
more readily turned from one emplo ~rment to another. Entrepeneurs 
are now bolder and better informed,and embark more readily on 
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new enterprieee • The intrinsic diffic'.l l ties of entering into 
competition with established business are not 80 great becauseo 
of the wider dif~sion of knowledge,and the scientifio and tech 
nioal press. 
However,wh*ther this argument,which is the much discussed 
intant industry argument,is valid or not,does not cencern the 
question ot the protection of the industries of the United 
States against those ot Canada. The former are not infants 
cOmpared with the latter,and can therefore,not de~and protection 
on this ground. But ae a corallary ot that conelusion,it might 
be inferred that the industries of Canada are infants oompared 
to those of the United States,nnd therefore need protection 
against them. That 6anadia.n 1ndustry doee not need such protect1on 
I propose to show by a short descript10n ot the development of 
manufactures in the United States. 
IV. Development of l~anufactures in the Un! ted States. 
As a starting ponnt for a discussion of the development 
ot the manufactur1ng industry in the United States, the table 
on the next page will be inter r: sting,especia.lly as regards the 
subject of infant industries. It wa.s compiled from figures 
given in the Statistical Abstraot of the United States,1910. 
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Manuraotures in the United States. 
Groups of States percentage of total in the United Statea 
Wage earners Capital Value of prodacte 
New Enp:land 
1850 32.7%. 31.1~ 27.s%. 
1880 23.7% 22.4% 20.e;r; 
1900 17.2% 14.7% 13.7% 
Midd .!. 8 states 
1860 43.9% 44.2~ 46.4%. 
1880 41.7% 42.2% 41.3% 
1905 38.7% 39.6% I 37.3% Southern States I 
1850 11.5% 12.6%. 9.9%. 
1880 8.~% 8.9~ 8.3~ Ieee 14.0% 11.0% 10.5% 
Central States 
'1850 11.5% ll.s%. 14.3~ 
1880 23.6% 
I 
26.1% 28.5% 
1905 27:JkJ% 28.2% 30.5% 
Weetern otates 
1850 .1~ .1% .1~ 
1880 1.0% 1.0%. 1.4% 
1905 2.1% 3.2% 4.3% 
Pacific States 
1860 .4% .3%. 1.o%. 
1880 1.8% 2.5% 2.4% 
1906 3.0% 3.3% 3. 7~t, 
J 
--------------~------------------------------------------------
1. Statistioal AbBtra~t of the United States,1910,p.179. 
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The most general observation to m~de ~rom this table 1s taat 
the older seotions of the United Gtates,ao far ae the manufact. 
uring industry goes,ie gradually lOSing its pre-eminenoe by the 
growth or manufaoturing in the newer sections. In 1860, New 
Englann and the Middle States employed 76.6% of all the 
manufacturing wage earners in the United States,and produced 
74.2% of' the products. In 1905 they employed only 53.9% or the 
wage earners and produced only 61.0% of the products,a ~alling 
of~ in comparative importance of about one-third. During the 
same period,thett direot compet1tors,the Central States, 
increased the number of their manufacturing wage earners from 
11.5~ of the total in the United States to 27%,and the value of 
their produots from 14.3% to 30.5%. The Western States,also 
oompetitors of the New England and Middle States,as well ae of 
the Central States,increas d the relative percentage of their 
products from .1~ to 4.3% or forty-three times. 
The development of the Southern States was hindered by 
the Civil War,eo that in 1880 they might have been called new 
states. In the period from 1880 to 190f they increased the 
relative output of their ~actories from 6.3% to 10.6%. a relat*v8 
gain of nearly 70%. In the Pacific States the inorease in the 
fifty-rive years was more than double. 
We find, then, that the newer seeions of the oountry 
are gradually gaining the relative importance of their 
17 
manu~acturing output at the expense of the older sections. T~is 
fact might be lightly explained away by protectionists by say~g 
that it was due to the increase in population. BUt such an 
explanation does not disprove the faot that here we have new 
oommunities aotually developtng great manu~aoturing interests 
in oompetition againat older oo~munities against whom they have 
no protection. 
The g~th ot manufactures in the Central States is an 
espeoially interesting phenomenon when looked at in the light 
ot the 1 tant industry argument. These states have developed ~ 
into a manufaoturing seotion produoing manutaotured goods 
almost in proportion to their population as compared with the 
total population and manufactures in the United ~tates. They 
have done this in spite of the taot that their manufacturing 
establishments were comnelled to develop in direot comnet1t1on 
with the more firmly established manufactures of the eastern 
sectione,with their cheaper labor and capital. 
But when we examine the conditions in the Western States, 
by which we mean those west of the Missouri ~iver with the 
exception of the Pacifio States, we find that here manufactures 
have seemed to lag. These states have remained largely mining 
and agricultural communities. It might seem,then,that ,although 
the Uentral States ~ave managed to prosper without protection 
against their o,der neighbors, the Western States have not done 
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so,and that here we have the strange speotacle of a confirmation 
ot1lHf on the one hand and a con:f'uta tion on the other of the 
protectionist theory ,under similnr oircumstances. This apparent 
contradiction,how8ver, can easily be disposed of • It rests 
on the protectionist tallaoy that an extensive manu~acturing 
industry 1s necessary for the prosperity of any com~unity,and 
that therefore manufacturing establsihments are good ~er see 
We find that the Central States,be1ng well adapted tor 
the growth of manufactureo,have become manufacturing states to 
a markeu extent,and are very properous under their tree trade 
with the1r neighbors. We ftind that the Western States,not so 
well adapted for the growth of manufactures,have remained 
engaged more largely 1n the extract1_e industries. But their 
people are tor this reason neither poverty str1oken,m1serable 
and uncouth,nor oppressed by sap-sudmlng manufactures of the 
~ast. To make an off-hand comnar1son of the relat1~e prosper1ty 
and happiness of the people of d1fferent sections of a cauntry 
1s somewhat hazardous. Yet it would seem safe to say that the 
people of .t~ansas, of whom 1.8% were wage earners in manufa.cturing 
establishments in 190Q,were as happy and prosperous as the 
people ot Ill1nois,where the same percentage was 6.9% or the 
people of M&ssachusetts,where the percentage was 15%. 
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llaving noted rather briefly the general trend of development 
of manufacturing in the United States,let us glance' at the 
deter~ining faotors influencing that development. 
" Oertain factors are cecognized as influencIng the 
localization of industries. Among the casuees of localization, 
seven are enumerated in the ~welfth Censas,as follows: 
l.proximity ot raw material supply. 
2.Readily accessible ~arkets. 
3.presence of water power. 
4.¥avorable climate. 
t..Availability of labor. 
S.Availability of oapital. 
7.Momentum of an early sta#rt. 
" The first four of these are distinctly geographioal oauses, 
while the three remaining ones are more or les8 determined by 
the first :rour. 
" The data for these observations are based on the relative 
values of an industry in a states or oity as compared with the 
total value of the same induetry for the United States a.t 
large. Fifteen industries are sellcted to illustrate the 
principle. For example ,it 1s shown that the manufacture of 
agrIcultural implements is localized chiefly in II11nois,OhI0, 
-------------------------------------------~-------------------
1. Spencer Trotter,Geography of Commerce,p.127. 
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and llew York. The factors operating in the localization of this 
industry are .f .i.rst, the extention of the heart of the great 
agricultural section ,making a ready markot. This fact haa caue 
oaused t he movement of the agricultural implement industry :t"rom 
!;ew Ynrk westward on account of the cost of transporting the 
finished goods. A second fact is the nearness of the Ohio and 
Illinois districts to extensive hardwood foreats,while a third 
i'actor is the nearness of the iron supply.--------------------
----------" Massachusetts shows over 32% of all the cotton goods 
m;:lnufaotured in the country: tl1is is the result of' early 
utilization of water power and ~he presence of a moist climate. 
It s supremacy is clearly due to the advantage of an early st~. 
The southern states have advan~ed in cotton manufacturing durig8 
the last deoade,particularly North and ~outn Carolina,whlch 
SclOW a oombined increase (turing this period of upwards of 
2,000,000 spindtes. Over fifty new mills were completed in the 
two states in 1900. AcceSSibility to the raw material sup,ly is 
nere an important factor,coupled with water power,c '1eap :ruel, 
and the comparatively low cost of' liv ing. 
" pennsylvania produces 54% of all the iron and steel in ~ 
country from the proximity to the coal,and because of iron ore 
and limestone depOSits of the Alleghany plateau. In the early 
days it also had the advantage of the great forests of the 
region for fuel. the center of the inductry has migrated westW2rd 
from the anthracite region of eastern pennsylvain", to the 
western part 
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westorn part (Connesllsville distriot) and to eastern Ohio aa 
a result of the use of ook~ I(a bituminous product) in the 
blast furnaces ,and also bee.use of" the use of large qU.'-tnti ties 
of ~ake Luperior ore. The inorease of the industry in Illinois 
is the result of the greatmarket for steel gooda,the supply of 
fuel,and the proximity of the ore flelde.----------------------
------.-" The slaughtering and meat pacoing industry had its 
origin at Cinclnnatl,Ohio,as early as l818,incident to the 
livestock and corn production of" the surrounding region,and 
the transportation facilities of the Ohio River. The center has 
mi~rated westward with the westward extension of the corn belt 
and tho cattle ranges,and it is now 1n Illinois~ The Chioago 
paoking industry has an output of" over 35% of the totalUnlted 
States produot. Thisoentering o~ industry rests upon the 
~attenlng power of the corn belt tood sup,ly,and the railroad 
facilities which bring livestock from the more distant western 
ranges ,as weel as upon the perfected development of the cold 
storage prooess of shipment." 
, The tour examples quo~ed here from Trotter ,showing how 
these industries have grown up in newer sections because o~ 
geographical reasons,in competition with the establsihed indus-
tries of the older seotions,a~e but typioal of the development 
ot all industries. The industrial history of the United States 
has amply shown than an industry in a newer section with ample 
raw material supplies,power and transportation facilities,will 
compete with 
compete 8uocessrully with, and o~ten disp~ace an established 
industry in an older section. 
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I made the statement at the beginning of th :.8 section o:t 
this paper that the purpose of sketching the development oa the 
manu~acturing industry in the United States wae to show that th 
the induetrjes of Canada do not need protection against those 
of the United ~tateB. The oonnection seems obvious enough. 
Industrially the relation o~ Ontario and New York,for instance, 
is analogous to the relation of ~ew York to Ohio,or the relatinn 
of ~anitoba and New ~~land,to that of Nebrask~ and New England. 
Proteotion in the one case does not d1~fer from proteotion in 
the other in its eoonomic bearing •• If Kansas,for instance, can 
prosper without proteotion against the rest of the United States, 
there seemB to be no reason Alberta should not ~rosper under 
Similar CirCUmstances. 
Politics and local sentiment has not been lacking which 
would have destroyed free trade within the United States under 
pretexts Just about as sound ~rom an eoonomic point of view as 
those used to keep up the tar1ff wall between the United States 
and Oanada. The attempts of the American States to "protect" 
f~/""* their industries foom the industries of other 
states did not end with the adoption of the Constitution. 
• In gene~al the protective system is supposed to be drawn 
-------------------~------------- -----------------------------
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exclusively upon national lines; and it is constantly assumed 
that the only question between proteotionists and ~ree traders 
is as to whether foreign goods should be admitted in free 
compet1tion with domestic goods. But this was not originally 
so,nndis not altogether so even now.------------- The legislature 
of New York has passed laws requiring all stone used ~or public 
buildings to be dressed and finished within the state; and 
serious efforts have been made to compel such stone to be taken 
from New York quarries. The Common councils o~ some cities have 
repeatedly made efforts to prevent the admission into those 
citiee( for public use,at all events) of cert":lin cla.sses of' 
goods made i ;1 other cities. Heavy lioense tees have been 
repeatedly demanded by the Ruthorities of one state from the 
citiBens of wnother sta.te undertaking to seel goods within its 
borders. Many statutes and ordinances of this kind have been 
enacted,most of which however,have been held void by the 
~upreme Court of the United States as violative of the Federal 
Constitution. If it had not been for the existence of this 
Constitution and the firmness of the Supreme Court there can 
be little doubt that long before this time such laws and 
ordinaces would have become universal,becauEe they would have 
been enacted in retaliation,even in states where the people 
disapproved of them as an original proposition. The prinCiple 
underlying such statutes and ordinances is ~recisely the same 
as that which underlies and protective tariff what,soever. No 
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intelligent dist1nction can be made between the two cases. No 
sound reason can be given ~or maintaining a proteotive tarif~ 
between New York and Canada,which does not apply with a hundred 
:fold force to ... ·ew York and New Jersey." 
The last two sentences quoted could hardly be 
questioned 1f they were modified by the qualifying phrase "from 
an economic po1nt of v1ew.- It iB doubtful whtther they are to 
be conruted as they stand,yet 1t would be useless to deny that 
something more than pure economics is to be grrLppled wi th 
when we consider the commercial relations of two mutually 
independent nations. This someth1ng more is the political 
element. Let us consider for a moment,then, the theory of 
Frederick List,ae it is related to the queotion we are 
discussing. 
v. The Nat10nal System of Political Economy. 
The gener~l theory of .rederiok List is this: 
" H1story teaches us that nations which have been endowed by 
nature w1th all resources which are requisite for the attainment 
of the h1ghest gra.de of wealth and power,may and must--'Nithout 
on that aocount forfeiting the end in view--modify their system 
----------~-----~------~~--~-~~~--~---------~-~-------~--------
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according to themeasure of their progress; in the first stage 
adopting free trade with more advanced nations as a means of 
raising themselves from a statel of barbarism,and of making 
progress in agriculture; in the second etage,promoti~g manufacr*-
ures,fiaherles,navigation,and foreign trade by means of 
commerCial reatriotions,anu in the last 8tage,after reaching 
the highest degree of wealth and power,by gradually reverting 
to prinoiples of tree trade and unrestricted competition in the 
home as well as in the foreign market, that their agricultur'ats 
manufacturers,and merchants may be preserved from indolence,and 
stimulated to retain the supremacy which they have acquired. r~ 
the first stage we see ~pain,portugal,and the Kingdom of Naples; 
in the second,Germany and the United States of North Amerioa; 
France apparently stands close up on the boundary line ot the 
laat stage; but Great Britain alone at the prssnet time has 
~!.ctua.lly reached it." 
Since that naragraph was wri t ten there has " ~een a 
gre .1 t advance in the eoonomic development of the various nations. 
It i8 quite likely that List would now class the United States 
as having corssed the lid boundary line of the last stage. It 
that is the cas8,the doctrine of' List would demand free trade, 
rather than protection,as the proper policy fbi for the United 
States to pursue in regard to Oanada. 
However,Oanada is apparently in the aecond stage,and 
so according to the doctrine as given by List,should pursue a 
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a restriotive comMercial policy, of which protection against 
the industries of the United States would naturally be a nart. 
But let us look into the reasons List advanced to justify 
a restriotive oom~ercial policy on the part of a nation in 
the second stage of economic development. The central principle 
of List is the idea of National develon~ent. Nations can and 
w' ll if given an opportunity mutually restrain each others 
economio and political development. Astronger natIon,if given 
tree entranoe into the markets of a weaker,wil1 not only retaad 
the economic development of the weaker, hut even repress it 
alto gether. H1s re~edy for the weaker nation is for it to 
build itself up by oommercial restrictions into a oommunity 
strong enough through its diversified industrIes to Meet foroe 
with torce,whether economic or ~olitical. 
Now,although the theory of List "y be untversally 
applicable to Bema extent, we must remember that List was 
a German born i ~ ·. the year 1789. The international relatione of 
Germany in the format1ve period 01' his Lif'e were mainly 
po11t1oal,and politically Germany during that period was 
greatly humili#ated. His,is a theory then mainly applioable to 
u nation surrounded by hostile nations stornger than itself' 
and more or less bent upon its destruction. 
We may say of List's doctrine that it was probable good 
doctrine 1n the case of Germany in the middle of the nineteenth 
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century. it is a.pplica.ble in a. time when nations are ready at 
a moment's notice to j '.lmp at each others throat,when their rela-
tions are political rather then economio,and their ware often 
only the recult of personal quarrels and jealosieo of' their 
rulers. It becomes laes and less applicable as inter-national 
relations become more friendly,and the danr:er of political 
oppression of one nation by ~nother becomes less. Against the 
doctrien ot tree trade in 8tate~ of perpetual "peace List 
himself offers no objection: 
" If as the prevailing school requires,"he says,"we assume 
a universal union or confederation of all nations as the 
guarentee Cor an everlasting peace,the prinCiple of international 
free trade seems to be perfectly justified. The less every 
individual i8 restricted in pursuing his own individual prosperity 
the greater the number and wealth of those with whom he has 
free intercourse, the greater the area over which his 
individual ~i •• "&ctivity can exercise itself,the easier it 
w111 be for him to utilize for the increase of his prosperity 
the propert iea given him by nature, the knowle 'ige and talents 
whc1h he has acqulred,~nd the forces of nature placed at his 
disposal. As it is with separate individuals,oo is it also the 
case '.v1th individual coml"1unities,provinces,and countries. A 
Simpleton only could maintain that a union for free commerci~l 
intercourse between themselves is not as advantageous to the 
------------------------------------------------------------
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different states included in the United States of North Ameri~, 
the various departments of France,and to the various German 
allied states,as would be their separation by internal provincial 
cuoto~s tariffs." 
Now the situation confronting Canada to-day approaches 
much more ne~rly the condition of a state of universal pe~ce 
than it does the situation of Gormany at the time when List 
','/as formulating his theory. T'1ere is no reason to believe that 
the national life of' Ca.nada would be nlaced in jeonardy by 
freer trade relati ons with the United States. If free trade is 
desireable,as List says,between nations in a state~eruetual~ 
pe~ce,there 1s lietle reason for restriction of commercial 
re&~tions between these two countries. In fact there is no 
more reason to apprehend a w~r between Oanadland the United 
States than there is to expect a confliot between the western 
states and the eastern states of the union,if as much. 
~f the objection is raised that free trade between the 
United ~tates and vanada might in the end mean free trade for 
both of them with the world,we may answer that even then the 
theory of List would not be applicable with its old force. Wars 
among the nations of' western ~urope and i'C orth America.,at least, 
are likely to become a mere memory in the near ruture. This 1s 
so because of the growth of' democracy,glving the perRone who 
have usually to bear the brunt of warfare,a voice in the 
councils of war. A war-lord,or a comrnefcial baron can no longer 
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declare war without the concent of the men who are to fight his 
battles. Perhaps a stronger guarantee for peace are the 
intimate international commercial relations which have spuung 
up in spite uj' commercial restrictions. 
It would seem, then, that neither the theory of LIst nor 
of Hamilton justifies a restrictive commercial policy so far 
as the relations of the United States and Canada are concerned. 
Having now considered our problem in ita general &spects,more 
or leas theoretioally,let us next examine it more in particular 
in conneotion with the speoial interests ~* involved. 
VI. Canada and Freer Trade--From an Economio Point 
of View. 
the examination of this Dart of our problem will be 
carried on more orJ les8 in the light of the disoussion 
aroused by the recnet attempt at ReciprOCity, and extracts 
from many of the articles written during that discussion w1l1 
be quoted for the purpose of showing the attitudes of the 
various parties concerned. 
Now as regards the Canadlans,it is evident that we can not 
sum up their view in one aentence,and say thuB the Canadians 
looked upon this question. The opportunity tor gaining 
reciprocity with the United States which was given to our 
northern neighbors,presented them with no simple problem. They 
recogni 
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recognized that the reciprocity tie,so to speak,might be made 
out of a rope of many strands,which could not be unravelled 
from one another. On its face the problem presented was an 
economic problem. But the Canadians believed that it was bound 
up closely with political and social problems. 
I~ the Canadians had been asked to vote on the simple 
question n Will reciprocity be eoonomically profitable?" and 
no other question had been involved, there is no reason to 
believe that they would have answered in the negative. From wn 
economic point of view reCiprocity would have meant gain to the 
farmer,fisherman,lumberman,miner, and quitely in the end after 
a period of readju8t~ent,for the manufacturer. Each would have 
been given broader possible markets for his products, and they 
would not have had to be exceedingl y keen-minded men to 
recognize the advantage arising therefrom. Even with the 
manufacturers opposed, the vote should still have been in favor 
of freer trade relations. 
In 1911 the rural population of Oanada was 3,924,083,and 
the urban 3,280,297. WIth over half the population then directly 
engaged in agriculture,apparently,and with a considerable part 
of the urban population directly or indirectly interested in 
agricu1ture,fisheries,lumbering and minlng,we can see that ~rom 
-~---~------~-----~---------~----~------~-~--------------------
1. Fifth Sensus of Canada,191l,Speclal Report on Area and 
POnulatlon. 
an economic point of view reciprocity would have been 
advantageous to a large majority of the Canadian people 
immediately. This true because reCiprocity as provided for 
in the proposed agreement was little more or less than free 
trade in the natural products of Canada. 
The leading articles that were to be admitted free were 
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cattle ,horses ,hogs, \vhe'lt ,oats, barley, apples, potatoes, "'eaches, 
butter,cheese,eggs,fiah,timber,tinplates,type-casting and 
type-casting :'"'achines,ground pulp~chemic~l) and print paper 
up to a value of four cents a pound. Other articles,comprising 
Schedule B of the agreement were to enjoy a reoiprocal lowering 
of duties. The leading articles under this schedule were tresh 
meats,bacon,ham,salted beef, barrelled pork,canned vegetables, 
flour oatmeal,pl ~ughs,harrows,w~sons,and harvesters.In addition 
there were to be cert~in reductions inf duty no longer exactly 
reciprocal. 
But let us turn from these generalizatlons,and notioe 
s'.:me of' the particular economic results of commei'cial 
restrictions in Canada, which the reoiprocity pact might have 
made it possible to ellminate,0#4Imm=#1/0fMj~. 
" One able Oanadian writer calculates that the 'national' 
cotton industry of Canada,whloh in 1905 employed only 10,000 
----------------~-------------------------~-~~~~-----~------~-
1. Review of Revlews,April 1911.Reciproclty between the United 
States and Oanada. 
2. C.g.Mallet,Contemporay Review,Oct.1911,f The Case for 
ReCiprocity. p.485 
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handa,cost the Canadian people $5,000,000 ayear,------ and 
that the 'national' sugar refineries which employed less than 
1700 people,cost the plililic $2,000,000 a year." 
Another wtiter suys of the sugar industry that the 
people of Canada could pay a pension of 200 pounds a year to 
each of the 1800 employees engaged in the B~~qr rerjr.eries,and 
sti!l be over 300,000 pounds ahead,provided they could buy SBgar 
at the open world market price,and that the same is true o~ 
rubber and many other articles of general use. 
The coal industry is another ease in point just as 
striking: 
" Every province in Canada, except Nova Scotia, would be 
benefited by free trade in coal, for the existing duty in the 
Dominion tarif~ in the interest of the coal operators of Nova 
Scotia is costing the Dominion $3,500,000 a year." 
" Since 1879, there has been a duty on ~ bituminous 
coal with the avowed object Of holding the Canadian market for 
Nova Scotia mine, but after t~irty years of persistence,it has 
been f'ound impracticable to force Nova ~:; cotia coal into use in 
Ontario.That province still draws its increasing supplies ~rom 
Uni ted State s. It i ~:; , further, very doubtful whether the Nova 
1.J.J.Harpell,Contempoary Review,Jan.1910,p.98. 
2. Edward porritt,North American Review,189:688-94,Capada 
and the payne Bill. 
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Scotia mines are benefited by the restrictive policy,since they 
would in all probability find a ready marhet#for their coal, 
under free trade,in the Atlantic seaboard cities of the United 
States. 
These examples o~ protected industries in Canada show 
that the majority of the Canadian peole are being injured by 
the nrotective tariff directly. That the indirect benefits to be 
eXnboted in return for the present less,will ever offset this 
loss ,is exceedingly doubt~l. 
" The Liberal Oonvention of Ottawa in 1903 boldly declared 
that the ·'ational Policy,while building up trusts and combinations 
had decreased the value of farm property,had checked immigration 
and had impeded commerce. And it is impcssible to study the 
evidence collected by many Canadian writers withou~ admitting 
that the advocatee ot rieciprocity have strong grounds for the 
indictment they present. Production on a small scale has certain-
ly been checked. For one new manufacturing establishment 
created,many have disappeared.----- There are grave reasons for 
asking whether all the manipulation of interests and prices 
which goes on behind the tariff wall is really developong 
Canada in the best way; and the answer given by the agricultuniaff 
interests in the country is to-day of a decisive kind. The 
--~--------------------------------------------------- ---------
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unprotectGd interests--not consumers only--but the producers 
of the greatest wealth which the Dominion holds--declare that 
they are being injured for the sake of a few favored and 
organized interests.---- The farmers and fishermen have to sell 
their products in a market where the abundance of nature keeps 
prices down, and to buy all they want in a market where every 
price is artifioially raised." 
The foregoing is a sound criticism of the protective 
policy in Canada, with one exception. It can not be said with 
certainty either that the building up of trusts and combinations 
is bad per se,or that the disappearance of small manufacturing 
establishments has been due to the trusts. 
The attitude of the farmer .fJ#fJ.,jJJ.,.,H.#/ff#jj6#has not 
cha: 1ged aince 1893. " ~very agricultural paper in Cnnada and 
the most important of the farm organizations were heartily in 
its (reciprocity's) favor." 
We may safely say,then,that from a purely economic point 
of view the great body of Canadians were in favor of reCiprocity, 
and would have been benefited as a result of freer trade. But 
there were some men- who on aooount of vested interests-
opposed it on purely economic grounds. 
n In spite of the comparative immunity,and the private 
~~----------~--------~-------~~--------------- ---~~---------~---~-
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assurance that no further reductions were contemplated, the 
manufacturers and the allied banking and railway interests 
afraid of the thin 'edge of the wedge,fought the (reoiprocity) 
pact in almost unbroken ranks." 
l'heee opponent of reoiprooity were ln a position to make 
their opposition count out of proportion to their number. 
" Canadian protectionists are exeeedingly well organized. 
There can hardly be 200 manufacturers in the Dominion who are 
not "Tlembere of the Canadian Manufacturers t Association, w'hich 
has 2400 members." 
Now it cannot be denied that these manufacturers deserve 
some consideration in the commercial policy of the Dominion. If 
they have invested their capital in a business whioh must be 
proteoted to live,as some of them have,it must be said that 
they have done so at their own risk and with the expectation 
of' winning large profits. Yet the government which has encouraged 
them in this is hardly free from obligation to preserve them 
from rUinfnot only for their own sake,but f'or the sake of 
preventing such injurious reaction unon the business as a whole 
of the Dominion as might re6u~t from the shock of readjustment 
acoompaning a tree trade policy. 
----~------~-~----~-------------------------~------------------
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Not one of the least arguments against a protective system 
in any country is the fact the protected interests are likely 
to receive more than a just consideration in national legislation 
and thnt legislation in protected countries has a tendency to 
degener~te into a wild grabbing of sVecial privileges instead 
of performing its legitimate function of working for the general 
welfare. SuCh a tendency is appearing i~ Canada as it has 
appeared in the United States. 
" Many who have watohed the rapid growth of C&nadian 
manufactures forget the cost the country :f;had to pay. For years 
the Liberal leaders denounced the new system as unfair to the 
unprotected intereots,as wasteful,corrupt,oppressive in the 
tax whioh it levied on the masses of the peo~le. But ye.t when 
the ~ibera18 returned to power in 1896,80 strong was the hold 
of' the orga.nized interests, so difficult is it to abolish tariffs 
on the faith of Which manufactures have grown up, that the 
.... 
essential elements of the ational Po;icy remained unchanged. 
~'ew bounties in Some oases took the place or lowered duties, but 
the high duties of 25% to 35% remained substantially the same. 
And the new **"t" tariff of the Liberal party till then the 
clamorous advoc~tes of free trade,bemained in effect a tari~r 
framed to safeguard the interests of thooe Canadia.n 
-------------------~------------- ----- --- ---------------~--~ 
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manufacturero whose political in~luence was too strong to be 
denied. " 
Since Canada is pre-eminently an agricultural country, 
and an exporter of agricultural products,it can not be said that 
protection ie required for her agricultural interests. The only 
justifioation, t!len,from an economic point of view for Canada t s 
protective tariff wall against the United Statss,is that it may 
be neoessary for the development of manu:f8.~tures in Oanada. 
It is assumed that these .anu~actures would not develop w1thaat 
such proteotion. But this assumption does not seem to be 
justi~ied,if the development of manufactures in the newer 
states of the union can be said to demoBstrate the fact that 
manufaotures tend to grow up wherever the neoessary oonditions-
power,raw m~terial sUpply,marketa,and transportation facilittes-
are present. OUr contention here is,t~at with those necessary 
conditions present,manufactures will grow up without government 
aid. perhaps they will ~ev'3lop more raptdly with protection, 
but suoh unnaturally aoeeleaated growth is unhealthy,and is 
not an indioation of prosperity 
• 
Oanada boasts of tre~endous natural resources, natural 
~ transportation faci11ties, unrivalled water power. f hse has 
these,her manufactures will take oare of thems0lves,just the 
manu~actures of the Vnited ~tates would have taken care ot 
the.mselves,if they had been left to themselves. As regard 
2 
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the particular competition of the United States, the Canadian 
industries ought to thrive as well as have thrived those in 
the United States west the MisSissippi in competition with 
those in the East. If we take the case Of Missouri and compare 
her ~anufactures with those of Canada we are led to doubt the 
efficacy of protection against the United States even to 
accel ,';rate the growth of manufactures,* in Canada. Let UB 
glance at the comparison just a moment. 
Manufactures in Missouri and in Canada Compared. 
Valu*e of product 
Cana.da,1906. 
$718,352,605 
Missourl,1910. 
$817,000,000 
Wage earners 366,034 213, 641 
Wages p fl. id $134,375,925 $125,250,000 
It will be seen trom this table that the value ot the 
manufactured products of Missouri in 1911 waef almost as great 
as the value of the manufactured products of Canada in 1906. 
Althbugh the figurel for Canada in 1911 probably reaches or 
exceeds $1,000,000,000, it still remains true that Missouri 
manufactures which have never been protected against the 
country east of the Mississippi equal or exceed in per capita. 
value those of Canada which aave been so protected since 1878. 
------------ ------------------------~-------------------------
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I~ one wil~ take the trouble to look over the list o~ produots 
manu~actured,he will ~ind about as large a variety in the one 
case as in theother. But two notable items are lacking in the 
Missouri list which are r 0und in the Canadian list-- textiles 
and iron ~lnd steel,~or the p~,*s proud possession of 
which Oanada is paying a heavy Drice. 
Our conclusion from the ~oregoing,then ,must be that 
from the economic pOint of view, protection of Canadian industry, 
whether agricultural or manufacturing,is unsound ~nd 
undesireable. It causes the consumer to pay more #f.# for what 
he buys,and the retaliatory duties laid by the United States 
limits the market of the producer and lowers the price of what 
he has to sell. Furthermore it tends to create legislation 
solely in the interest o~ special classes, whereby a system ot 
logrol11ng arises ijjl#ft which for every dollar it benefits 
some special interest may cost the Dominion as a whole many 
times that amount. 
Let us turn next to a brief survey of ~eciprocity or 
freer trade relations with 0anada from an economic point of viww 
as it would effect the United ~tateB. 
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VII. The United States and Freer Trade--From an Economic 
Point of' View. 
I have already shown that it is on the verge of absurdity 
for the American manufaoturer to demand protection against the 
industries of Canada. But undoubtedly American protected inte~at8 
would oppose tree traJ e with Canada,as they are said to have 
opposed reoinrocity as the entering wedge of free trade,altho - ~h 
the proposed agreement was distinctly favorable to them. From, 
an eoonomic p 0 int of vio~ ,howover, th0i r oppositioh to rree 
trad. with the country north of the Great Lakes is as 
unjustifiable as would be their opposition to free trade with 
the co untry west of the Mlssissinni. It is not so much their 
fear of meeting any Canadian competition which would arouse 
their oppoai t:L.on, '1. S the fear that concessions granted to Canada 
might be extended to other countries. 
The American consumer would gain from freer trade 
relations with Ca.nada,i!' we consider him as an abstraction. 
But concretely,the consumer is also a producer in most cases, 
and we must consider whether as a con8umer he would gain more 
than as a producer he might lose. It is pretty olear that if' 
freer trade would,as eoonomic theory holds that it would, 
increase the abundance of economic goods by cheapening 
production, then the consuming public as a whole would gain. But 
80me of these consumers engaged in the production of certain 
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protected commodities might su~fer temporary economic loss. 
Let us consider the case of the farmer,who is both a producer 
and a CUnHumer of the ar Licles in w ' ich there would be direct 
competition between the United titates and Canada. 
As the proposed reciprocity pact was drawn up- with 
practical free trade in the farmer's ~roducts,with on~y reduced 
tariff rates on the corresponding manuractured products- a 
pact so drawn up as to promise reduced ~rices for the farmer's 
products,with no equivalent reduction in the price or gOO'dB 
he has to bUy-- with the agreement the farmer obviously had a 
right to quarrel. The Americ~n farmers if they had been given 
an opportunity would have voted down this agreement more 
emphatically than did the Canadians, and they would have done 
so on purely economic grounds. To the American rarmer it might 
well have seemed unjust to take away his protection at the 
very time it really' began to protect. 
Some of the objections of the American farmnr to reciprocity 
with Canada as it was proposed are as follows: 
1. It i e not r -:al reciproci ty- the farmer gets nothing in 
return. 
2. It will reduce the price of wheat. 
3. J.nie will re-act on the wheat and corn acer r),ge and reduce 
-------~--------~--~-------------------------------------------
1.G.C.Whlte,Jour.pol.gcon.,July,1911. The proposed Agreement 
as Viewed by the Farmer. 
the price of corn,~n ' other farm prducts. 
4. It leave s the -n:-1nufacturer protected and the :farmer 
unprotected. If the manufacturer wants cheaper food for 
the sake of cheaper labor,let him give up his own protection. 
B.lt would be far better to ~roduce our food at home and have 
our own farmers proBperous consumers than pay our money to 
the Canadian former for his products with no assurance 
that he will spend any part of such money for AMerican 
goods. 
~We find the Amerioan f"armer thencrying out that ., it is 
unfair to protect the manufacturer a, ',d not protect the farmer. 
Be asserts that he has been tricl-: ed into paying unnecessarily 
high prices for manufactured products in the past by the 
promise that the home market thue built up would pay him higher 
prlces in the future. Now,he says, just when the Amerioan 
market promises to rise above the level of the world market, 
andhe is ready to re~p his reward,his protection 1s to be swept 
aside. The proteoted manufacturer of the United States,with his 
various arguments for protection, would find it .1ff1cult to 
answer these ob ,'! ections and complaints of the farmer. But let 
us exam1ne them ~or ourselves,both from a theoretical and from 
a practical standpoiQt. 
First as to theory. The theory of protection as advanced 
bl List and Hamilton had no referaace whatever to agricultural 
products, but nolely to manufactures. Their doctrine dOGS not 
aOBume the policy of protection to be applied to an industry 
impeded ,not by artiticial and removable, but hy natural and 
p e rmanent obstao1es. All protection to agriculture is an abuse 
of the theory of protecti on to i nfant industries differing only 
in degree foom the case of proteoting the banana industry in 
Minnesota. 
ft The argument for agricultural protection is forced to 
abandon the infant industry plea,and mere~y apneal (like the 
modern form of the argu.T!Jent for protection to manu:'"'aotures) to 
an alleged difference in the cost of production a" home and 
abroad. In this form it becomes and argument,not for a bemporary 
but for a per:r1anent policy, which means, in brief, that the 
protect e: d industry shall be made permanently a parasitic 
industry, ao be :nai "lt '1.ined at the expense of all other industria s, 
and,moreover,that the 1es8 suited it is to the country, the mora 
tho people s :'lal..L be taxed for its support." 
Protection to both agriculture and manufacture at the same 
tiee is inconsistent with any and every rational theory of 
protection- itis like an attempt of a man to lift himself by h*e 
boot straps,or to saw a piece off one end of a board and nai~ 
it on to the6# other in order to ~ake the whole longer. The idea 
------------------------------------------------
I.E.Van Dyke Robinson,Jour.pol.Econ.,July,1911. Reciprocity 
and the Farmer. 
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of diff'erencein the fost of production carried to its logical 
re:m.l ts wo·~ld prohibit all foreign commerce whatsoever. From a 
thooretical point of' view the farmer's plea for protection is 9 
very W':lak. 
Fro~ a practical point of view it is doubtrlll whether 
the fll.rm Gr would gain anything from protection against Canada. 
Wi th free trade between the two co'.mtrie r: the chief Canadian 
products the Amerioa.n farmers would have to comnete with would 
be wheat,barley,and flaxseed. Now," only one farmer in ten in b 
the United Sta.tes has any material interest in wheat,barley , 
or flaxseed,aa a producer, while all are interested as consumers 
of w!'leat and fl'uxseed products." 
Up to the present time, the price of wheat in the United 
btates has "been with the exc0ption of a few ti~e8,on a world 
market level. Therefore free trade in wheat can now be had 
without encroaching upon vested intorosts,since under the 
circumstances it could not lower the price of whea.t. The same 
is true of other farm nrodLCts in Which the United States and 
Canada would be brought into tompetition under free trade. Only 
in case Canada should be able to increase her production of 
wheat to s'lch an extent as to lower the world price would the 
American farmer suffer from her competitlon. 
------------ --------_ .. _----------------------------------------
I.E.Van Dyke Robin8on,Jour,pol.~con.,July,191l. Reciprocity 
and the Farmer. 
iJhat :free trade in agricultural products between the Un1 ted 
States and Canada would do Vlould be this,as stated by Prsident 
laft. 
" It would increase border sales by giving nearer markets, 
a~d would 8l11arge the suppl, of farm products for our peo1)le, 
and. thus prevent undue enhancement of prices." 
It may be pointed out here that horsGs,cattle,and hogs, are 
higher,rather than lower in Ganada thnn they are¥ in the United 
Ltates,and the same is true of eggs and butter,especi~lly in 
western Canada. Therefore it is quite possible that the 
American whellt grower,if he should be injured by free admission 
of wheat,could recoup himself by the higher price for his 
anim::.. l products which a broader market would afford. It is 
certain that one of the reH111ts of free trade would be some 
SUC ;-l readju ~:tment in Lhu geographic : ~, l division of labor in 
agricultural productioh. Such a readjustment would unquestion-
c.b ly be e.dvantageous to the people 118 a whole, al though a :few 
Indi vidualc night suffer temnor[l.ry 108s. 
~o put agriculture upon a protected basis would be 
calamitous to the gernerp,l welf ::l, re of thE: nation,and would 
most likely prove injurious to the agricultural population 
itself in the end,by ~akin8 it s prosperity depend upon 
leeislation,which is uncertain,rather than upon natural conditmons 
and ability. 
-----------~--------------------------------------------------
1 . .. . h.Ta:ft,JOur.pol.Econ,July,1911,Reciprocity with Canada . 
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The farmer who would be lmcertain whether or not to sow wheat 
in the fall of a presidential year,or one the eve of a tariff 
reform, would not only be in an unenviable position himself, but 
would prove a '!Joor food supplier ofr a nation. Farmers as a 
whole could afford to accept a somewhat lower ~rice for their 
proJucts vlith that price resting upon the firm foundation of 
supply and demand,than to obtain a ~igher price which would 
depe nd upon the political complexion of current legislation. 
lInd even with ~ protected agriculture,the possible addition to 
thE: price of farm pro lJucts would not likely find ito way into 
the n ' ckets either of those who were actually tilling the soil 
or those who have built up the "home market" by bying 
protected manufactured goods. A great part of it would be nn.id 
out as ront or ili.terest on the increased capitalization of 
land a.n increase in the price of farm products would warrent. 
On the question of freer trade relations with Canada it 
would seem to be in the best interests of the farmers to 
accept free trade in farm nroducts,and clamor for free trade in 
manufactured products,not only with Canada,but with other natinns 
rather t~an to accept the principle of perpetual protection in 
manufactured goods,and clamor for p6"petual protection in 
agriCUltural products. Freer trade,for the farmer ftC well as 
for others, would mean the advantage to be reaped from an 
increasing profitahle trade. 
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In conclusion of our discussion of ~#Np###~#t our subj ect 
f'ro rr: un economic point of view, 'e may say that, vested interests 
not u nder consideration,free trade between the United States 
and Canada is highly desireable. The vested interosts,however, 
complicute the situation. Some Canadian manufacturers mjght 
suffer severely. To these the Canadian 8overnment,if it is 
reoponslble for their pOsition could lend aid in transferring 
their carital to more natural and suitable industries. 
A~ericnn manufacture rs would not suffer to any serious extent 
unless the :freer relations should he extended to other countrie s. 
In that case the reduction in the tariff would have to be made 
cautious ly and [~ r1l.dually so as to prevent an unnecessary shock 
to the general buslne8B ~ nterep.tB of the country. 
As to the pos oibility of securing the consent of the 
American peopl~ to ~r~er trade relations,thie much is to be 
said. The American f a rmer if given a voice in the ~atter would 
not readily Mf accept ~ree trade with Canada unles8 the 
manufacturing interests would concede freer trade relations in 
manufa ctured products to some extent with other countries. In 
that case he would probably be found in favor of unrestricted 
trade with Oanada. With the present sentiment in favor of tariff 
revision, ~nd the Buffering consuner held up as an object of 
p1ty,it 18 altogether unlikely that such concessions could not 
be wrung rrom the manufacturing interests. We may Bay then, tht 
th1.t,not only ie :freer tra.de with Canada desireable on the l'art 
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of the United States, but that legislation to that effect is at 
the preoent time expedient and possible. 
VIII.Canadian Polictic8 and Recinrocity. 
It is the consensue of opinion that politics, and not 
Canadian economic theory,killed Reciprocity in Canada. When 
the Canadians voted on the question of recinrocity and defeated 
the Liberal government,there were many cross-currents in the 
I political stream. Yet" it w"ae undoubtedly the reciprocity 
issue that decided the election.lt fs further beyond doubt 
thut it was the political rather than the economic asnect of' 
the case that carried mORt weight." 
" From the outeet opnonents of reciprocity concentrated 
on the political issue. The government was denounced as favoring 
an agreement which was the forerunner of annexation, the 
death-blow to Canadian nationality and British connection.-----
b:very American crOS8-r ads politician who talked of the Stafrs 
and Stripes floating from panama to the pole was set doan as a. 
statesman of national importance,voicing a universal sentiment." 
Ancient prejudices and smoldering causen for dislike of 
the United States were raked up and fanned into a blaze. It 
------------------------------------------_. ---------------
1.O.D.Skelton,Jour.poJ . • Econ.,Nov.,1911. Canadaws Rejection 
of Reciprocity_ 
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seems that the Canadian people were in~luenced as much or more 
perhap~s by a desire to "get even" with the ~mericans for 
pa !:" t inRul ts a nd injuries, as they were by the fear of pol it ieal 
and Bocial evils that might arise from closer trade relations. 
The voters still rernembered,or if they did not remember 
they were remined or the faet that many of their ancestors had 
been driven fro~ the United ~tates in the time of the Revolution, 
and their estates confiacated,that Canada had been invaded by 
Unitod btatee arm1es,that the Reciprocity Treaty of l8rA wos 
broken off by the United btates as a politioal move to force 
Canada into the Un1on, that the United ~tate6 broke off the 
fish1dg treaty of 1871,that the United States Senate refused to 
rat1fy a new fisheries treaty and passed a Bill of Non-intercourse 
wi th Canada, that thr;- Dingley and McK1nley tariffs raised the 
average dutl :;s of Cana.dian exports to 50% and 49% respectively, 
while Canada's average o~ united States exports was about ?g%, 
that the Liberal-Conservativo party ~ade a final but vain effort 
for betterMent of trade relations in 1892,and that the Liberal 
party made three more ineffectual efforts in lS90,1897,and 
1899. 
" These long years of varying menace,of fruitless quest, 
and coustant reburf,had their effect upon Canada.She was thrown 
------- --------------------------------- --------------------
1. George ~.Foster(former Minister of Finance in Canada) 
Nineteenth Cent.,tUne,1911, Canadian Autonomy and American 
heclproclty,A Candadian Point of View. 
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back upon herself,the strong grain of indenendence and loyalty 
to British institutions was hardened and poli ~~ed,and the 
dim gli~merings of early hope broadened into the all-alluring 
vision of a strong Canadian nationality under the aegis of an 
all-wOl'ld Bri tish Empire. 
" A~ericats refusal of fair trnde,American menace and 
prssure were aswered by Canada in a determination of becoming 
free therefro~,of building up a distinctive nationallty,and 
maintaining a posit1on of economic and political independence n 
under the britinh flag. Her instruments ~or this undertaking 
have been a protective tariff,establish~ent of home industry, 
inter-provincial trade,and development of a water and rail 
transportation system." 
This policy the writer quoted has been very success~l 
in building up traae and industry and attracting iMmigrants. 
Another thing ~hich undoubtedly had an influence in the 
election is the fact that some Canadians at least consider the 
Americans as being,~olitically and socially, in bad circumstances 
It is charncteriEtic of a young nation,as of a young hu~an 
being, that it i8 far more likely to see the faults of its 
elders than its own,and that it has a tendency to m<J.gnify ita 
own wiadom. The United St8~es han ~uffered to some extent from 
its self styled virtue and precocity,just as we ~ay suspect 
Canada of suffering ....... ere is what some Canadians thi~ of us 
was 
as it II expressedin an article# published in the Toronto 
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'i/orld while thc recipI'ccl ty cam'!1aign wa.s on. 
In the United. Staten they are chnined down to a Aystem 
imposed upon men now living by men who have been dend ~or one 
hu.ndrod years. The Prel3 ~ dent CA.n not cure the evils he finds 
he1~re him.The Senate has Erabbed many nowera and haa beco~e a 
hO.8e of pr'i vi i ege. 'rlhe popular hlouse haa become and insignit'-
1 cant i !If'luer..ce, through which the ',- iewa of t \ '0 neople can not ~e 
reul1 zed. The I\merican const 1 tut 1 on and l3y8 tom of gove rnrnent ha. 8 
brol:en down; mighty chun p:es are at hand,a.nd the American people 
~U8t tind a wuy of eoverning th' mselves. 
Likew1ee,~ acoording to this article,American f'inance haa 
broken down. The most extravagant gambling institution in the 
world 1e Wall Street. It 1s based on robbery,chenting and 
demoralization. Of all the rotton things in Wall Street, the 
rottonest is over-capitalization and the enormous consolidation 
o~ intereots,and the attendent thereupon issue of securities 
larKely made up of' water. MuniCipal f'runchlses have been 
exploi ted in the monet shanei'ul way. Railways a.nd tramways hR.ve 
been watered and re-watered ~or the bencftt o~ exploiters. 
Im~ence truats,controlling the necessities of life,have not only 
cornerf:;(l the comrnodity,but watered the organization as a 
f'inancial proposition to ten times more than it should have been 
in some cases. 
Unfair concentration of' canital,stock-watering and 
stock gambllng-- these three combined can ruin almost any nation. 
Arld#_ the worot thing of' all is that the financial abuses which 
are BO enormoUEI nnd. far-reaching are to-day entrenched in the 
con£ltl tu tion. You ',:ust smash the constitution to smash the abuse s. 
Such Ie the opinion of some Canadians of conditions in the 
United States. 
From auch an ungodly crew and ill-fated passengers of our 
ship of etnte, the '~ anadians might well turn away in alarm. But 
they were someWhat unduly alarmed. 1~e conditions are hardly as 
serious as the Toronto World points out. If the Canadians 
will only look about them, they may find problems of their own. 
V/ithout doubt the Canadians were afraid of those trusts 
r"entioned in the article 1 have been quoting. Said Mr,Borden 
in a speech in the House on February 9,1911: 
" We can guard agni8st our own trusts and combines by 
appropriate legislation passed by the parliament of Oanada,but 
we have no rne~ns except our tariff to guard against the trusts 
of' 
and cOr.1binec of other conntr i ee. With Il tariff' union"the two 
countrtcfl there must be a political union for Oanadian protect'on. 
We have now seen the Canadian attutude toward reCiprocity 
through the eyeo of its opponents. ~et us now see it through 
the eyes of one of the most vigorous ad.vocates of reci~rocity. 
J uhn A. i~;a cdonllld. 
1 
1 
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" '!'he truth is;lthe most potent factor in the election was 
not tIle economic arlument, or the commercial advantage which 
reciprocitp in natural ~roducts would have broughj, but the 
vague pre judice against the United States, the distrust of t ' le 
sincerity of the American politicians and the uneasy ~ear that 
free trade relations mi~ht in Borne way lead to cleser oolitical 
connection.It wao sentiMent and not reason,fear and not argument, 
that tipned the ocale againot reci~rocity. For many yearp there 
has been in the sub-conccioueneAs of Canada a resentment at the 
open disregard of' Canadin.n interests manifested by the United 
States in avery amendment of the Amercian tariffo.~flt,~~~~~f 
~rohibitive tariffs on the natural products of Canada destroyed 
Canadian trade and greatly hampered Canadian development. 
"bact. of all this was the unforgotten grievance of Canada 
against the United ~tatee,in which Britain was aleo involved 
because of tne settlbment of intcr-nat!onal boundary di8putes~ 
-------"That old sense of having berm given the worst of every 
barga1n was revived a r.d made acute when a new bangain Wfl8 
propoeed. ------------
------- "The spread-eagle1om of the American politician," too, 
says MaCdonald," and the lavish display,bonetfulmess and 
flaunting of the stars and strine ::: by the American tourist in 
~----------------------------------- -----------------
1.J.A.Macdonald,Contemporary Review,lTov.1911.The Canadaian 
hlectlone and Arterwards. 
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in Canada hue made a widesproad di s like of American ways. 
" r'.ll these things conspired to create a general prejudice .IM 
against tho United ~tates,und to this prejudice the opponents 
of the Laurier government made diroct and persistent appeal. 
--------" The Union Jack was waved as against the fear of the 
StUDS and ..... tripes. To argue against !:',uch an a-ppeal,or to renson 
with emotion aroused,was as vain and futile as to rebuke a 
London fog. ------Beyomd. all question the appeal was irre,lavant, 
' tnd the fear of annexation as a possible reoult of reciprocity 
awl 
in trade was utterly rediculously abBurd." 
We find, then, that the political conside""'ations that 
led the Canadians to refuse reciprocity lay in the past more 
than in the present or the future. This being the case,we can 
#expect the Canadians to reverse their decision if again given 
the opportunity to vote on freer trade relations. There are 
two reaons for hoping for such a result. First, having now 
had their little revenge for rebuffs received at the hands of 
the United States,one motive for refuBing reciprocity would be 
weakened. The ot ' lor iB that prejudice,althoup;h hard to argue 
against, gradually weakens with time,as the prejudice in the 
Uni ted ~tates against anything British has wee,kened. Without 
c:oubt another campaign for freer trade relaidmJ1s would see 
the same prejudice appealed to in Canada,but the responce would 
not likely be so strong as before. The majority against reciprocity 
1 
was not very large,and a little change in sentiment might 
overturn it. 
IX. Reciprocity and the Empire. 
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perh~,s the strongest oppositivn to reciprocity devel~ed 
in England rather than in Canada or the Un ited States The 
British (Conservative) arguments ranged all the way from the 
assertion that reciprocity would inter~ere with the Imperial 
preferential tariffs,to the assertion that it would destroy &11 
possibility of Imperial Union and a possible Imperial Zoll-
verien,and would lead to the annexation of Canada to the 
United States. Some British writers say in the proposed agree-
ment the gateway of eoonomic ruin for both the United States 
and Canada. Canadian agriculture would ruin the United States, 
and the United States manufactures would ruin Canada. 
one British writer declares that President 'j,'aft con-
ceived the bril11anti idea of offering the Cnaadians such terms 
of reciprocity as might induce the rr to become the future he~rs 
of wood and drawers of water for their 8uothern neighbors. 
He mentions Senators Oummings,Jones,and Mccumber,and Champ 
Clark as 01en1y favoring annexation. 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 Roper Lethbridge , Nineteenth Century,June,191l, 
Canadian Autonomy and American Reciprocity: an 
English r oint of View. 
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Another points out that the :roundation of the German Zo11-
ver&in lead surely and steadily to the creation of the new 
German ~mpire a generation later .The majority of the population 
o~ the United States,he says,expect what most CanadianConservatives 
and many Canadian Liberalc dread, the paci~id absorbtion of the 
Dominion by the U~ited States. Farmers for the Republic will 
move north in larger numbers than ever, but they will move ~or 
business reasons on l y,and under the new conditions, their trade 
and railway connections with the United States would be far 
more important to themthough settled on Canadian soil,than any 
.... 
Canadian political interests whaasoever. I these circumstances 
reciproci ty would widen batura11y into a North Ay" erican 2011-
verein,with free trade from Panama to the pOle,and a proteftion-
ist tariff wall against nIl the world without, including the 
United .t\ingdom. 
Anothilr mm .L!JngliBhml"J,n says that " any agreement from 
which the rest of the Empire is excluded, and which brings one 
portion of the empire into more intimate relations witha foreign 
countr. ' than the rest of the ~pire, and which tends to ma.ke the 
development of that great Dominion more and more dependent upon 
foreign enterprise,foreign capital,and foreign routes of travel, 
than upon the established lines which run onBritish territory 
------------------------------------------------------ . . _-----------
l.J.L.Garvin,Fortn.Rev.,~arch,191l. Imperian Union and American 
Reciprocity. 
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i r. : mn. t ter for ImpE:Jrial anxiety." 
Having soen now what some Britioh opponents of reciprocity 
believe might happen with freer trade relation, let us next examine 
th6 actUfll problem of Imperial real t10ns in connection wi th 
freer traue between the United States and Canana. One of the 
most important phases of this problem concerns the Imperiam 
preeerential tariff. 
Since July 8,19QO,Hritiah goode have enjoyed a pre~erence 
of one third 1n the vanadian tariff. The avorage Canadian duties 
ru .:ge fro~ 10% to 35% a~ valorem. This leaves British goods 
t~~xed at from 8% to 2'1%. 
" This much must be allowed,Fl,s rep;ards British interests: 
that,1n so far 8a reciprocity would encourage free trade and 
destroy protect10n,in so far it must destroy the system on 
which Imperial prefenence depends. But when it comes to walghi8g 
the loss involved,there is little to be ~ade of it. E~en the 
preference has not been ahle to break down the tariffs against 
us; and if" rociprocity led as it ~ight,to an all round 10'.'1ering 
of thoBe tariffs in the future, to that extent our T~ anufacturera 
would gain. bvery blow struok to Canadian protection is a blow 
strack in the behalf of our traders."----------------------
____ a preference has not enabled ue to hold our own against 
---------------------- ---------------------~-----------------
'.~d.nburgh Review,April,1907.Colonl~1 Prefenent1al Tari~f8. 
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the United States in the Canadian market,or to prevail against 
geogrnphical conditions and the similarity of tastes and habits 
\vhich make it inevi tab~e for CanadianEl and Americ"ns to trade 
with ooe anot ·' er. 
" .i:!;ven under 'Preference Ca· ada's exports to the United 
Mingdom,in spite of the large increase in her 'ood exports, have 
fallen from 59~ in 1897 to fio1 in 19JO,whereas her exports t 
the United States have risen from 32% to 37%.Even under prefer-
ence,American trade and the America.n markets are more important 
to Canada thnn our own." One of the chief reasons for this is: 
" The AtlantiB Ocean serves as the great barrier,and will 
always aot aF. an ally to the United Statee in her competition 
with the United Aingdom to supply the wants of the Dominion, 
and the value of this alliance fnr outwei~h8 any possible scheme 
of prE:tferenee." 
We find then that ureat Britain would lose little by the 
breakinr, down of the preferential tariff,and that She might 
gain more in the end by the breaking down of the protective 
system in Canada,ao well as in the United States. Britain's 
interflst in freer trade relations between the United States and 
Canada,we must con elude is mainly political rather than economic. 
If' there is no danger of Canada breaking away form the Empire 
I.Edinburgh Review,April,I J07,COlonial and preferential Tariffs. 
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because of reCiprocity,then Britain has nothing to fear. 
Now,just what is the danger of Canada becoming a political 
annex of the United ~tates' because o~ freer trade relations? 
~here seems to be no reason why Britain,or Canada either, 
shoulu apprehond and uuch • result. In the first place,i! the 
Unitod States bad any strong desire to incorporate Canada in 
her political domain,it is probable that she would have attempted 
it before now. ~econdly, the chief motive ~or any naticn to 
do any land ~rabblng io desire for greater freedom of trade with 
a larger extent of territory. Nothing will arouse the 60mbative 
spitit 0 much as the knowledge that something is to be gained 
by fighting. Therefore ,if Hritain fears that Canada may desire 
to ,or mny be forced to become a political annex o~ the United 
Dtates,the worst policy she can pursue is to attemnt to hamner 
natural trade relation between the two countries. 
In the third place, over half of ~anada'8 foreign trade 
is with the United Staten now,and yet, before the question of 
reciprocity was brought up, there was little to be heard of a 
political union between the two countries. If Canada can do 50% 
her trading with UB,and not become ~nd adjunct of the United 
~tates politically, why should there be danger of annexation 
the moment that trade promised to become a little larger and 
more profitable? In fact there is less sentiment in the Unitsd 
States in favor of annexing Canada than there is for annexing 
Uexie., w1th whom we have only half the trade that we enjoy 
1 
with Canada. This is true because the Americans are more secure 
in ther1 business relations with Can'ada tha.n with Mexico. 
;x. Diplomatic Difficulties. 
It io asserted that there are diplomatic di:rfiCl~.l tiee in the 
way ot treer trade between the United States and vanada. 
" Oanada is a narty to the Imperial treaty eystem,and she can 
not give to the United States what she does not give to all t.f 
oountties with which she haa moet eavored nation treat1es." 
There 1s a solution for this difficulty " under a system 
1 whioh would give the United Aingdom and each state or the ~plre 
a reoiprocating and o,n Empire tariff." 
2 
As tar as the most favored nation clause is conoerned,the 
United ~tate8 is at liberty to grant reciprooity or ~ree trade 
to Oanada without thereby necessarily embarking upon universal 
free trade. The rollowing is the A~erioan interpretafon' of 
the most favored nation cla.use' 
" The most favored nation olause or our treatise with 
foreign powers have from the foundation of our government been 
invariably construed both as not forbidding any internal 
--------------------~--~-------------------------------------------
1.Benj.Taylor,Fortn.Review,Oct.191l. preferential lrade in 
the Aiirnpire. 
2. Oplnlbon or Attorney General Olney,Nov.13,1894.(H210p.80-83) 
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regulations necessary for the protection of our home industries, 
anu as nermitting commercial concessione to a country which 
are not gru.tuitous,but are in return for equivalent concessione, 
and to which no other country is entitled except upon rendering 
the same equivalent." 
The ~preme Court of the United States,as well as the 
Secretaries o'f the ~:t1y# State, <Te'fferson,John Quincy Adams, 
Clay,Livingston,~vart8,and Bayard,took the same position in 
regard to the favored nation clauses. 
XI.American Statesmen and Politicians and the 
Question of Annexation. 
As to whether 'freer trade would lead to annexation,! 
have eaid something in other sectlhons of this paper. Unfortunately 
some of our statesmen have permitted themselves to make indis-
creet remarks which can be interpreted as meaning that the 
United ~tates is ready to gobble up Canada on the first pretext. 
Preeident '· 'aft and Champ Clark, becauee of their prominent 
posi tions, stand out as the chief offender's in this re spect, 
while Hoosevelt might have refrained from repeating an unfortu-
nate starement of 1a'ft,and thus avoided increased publioity et 
it. O'f Clark's re~ar.,nothing need be said ~ except that it 
smacks of' the cheap political patriotism of "Hip,hip, hurray, 
boys,wetre all for the flag. Come out and vote." 
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Taft's remark wau little more nor less than the truth baldly 
statod in such a way as to wO t~d sensitive inter-national faIlings. 
"The amount of Canadian produce we would take would produce 
a cur~ent of business, between Western Canada and the United 
States that would make of vanada only an adjunct of the United 
Btates." Such a remark could not but have an insulting sound to 
the sensitive Canadians • Of course ~a~t meant only an economic 
adjunct. An adjunct by difln1tlon is something added to, but not 
a part o~. It iaa comple~ent,or a help. I~ Canada becomes 8S 
adjunct of the United Statesl (infact,if we can judge by trade 
figures# r:hef is that already) The United States by the same 
process beCOMes and adjunct of uanada. Because Canada is the 
smaller adjunot is no sign that she will suffer thereby. The 
so 
remark of President ~aft is notAominous as it Bounds. 
Secretary Kno. has better expressed the general sentiment 
of the United States toward Canada. 
"The proposition with which we have to deal is economic, not 
pol1tical.The United States recognizes with satisfact10n that 
the Dominion of Canada is a permanent North American polit1cal 
unit,and that h er autonomy 1s secure."------The two neoples are 
and always have been most closely related geographically and 
rac ~ ally.Pursuing the asme course of development and fostering 
--------~-------~------~------- -------------------------------
1.Speech of the Hon.Philander Knox before the Chicago Association 
of Oommerce,Feb.15,191l. Printed,~ 8lst Congress,3d SeSSion, 
House of A ep .noc.1418. 
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Lh6 same ideals, their socinl relati ons have been intimate and 
complex,and inevit9.bly brought them together politically in the 
sBBse, but only 1 " the sense of possessing similar laws and 
systems of government,and the symnathies of llke desires,although 
living under separate sovereignties." 
XI ;r .Conclusion. 
We have now considered the question of ~f ~r6er trade 
relations between the United States and Canada ~rom several 
points of view. We have glanced at the theory of protection, 
and have ~ound that it does not warrant a tari~~ wall between t 
~e United States and Canada. We hnve examined the arguments or 
the special interests involved.and find that they do not 
justify a restriotive commercial policy. We have seen that 
nei ther Great Britain nor Canada need to .fear territorial 
aggression on the part or the United States be~ause of freer 
trade--that,i~ fact, commercial restrictions would only serve 
to magnify any such desire on the part of the United Statee if 
it did exist. Social l y Canada need not ~ear contamination 
through closer trade relations with her neighbor. if euch 
contamination ii possible under free trade,it is just ae 
possible under protectIon when even under protection more than 
half of Canada's commercial intercourse with the world is with 
us. To escape such contamination,if it is pOSSible, Canada 
would be compelled to pas~ a bill or non-intercoureo ag ' inst 
the United ~tateo,[\nd enforce it patroling her southern border. 
de have seen that the majority of the people both of 
Canau and the United States would be benefited by freer trade. 
Furth€1rmoro it seemB thllt legislation to secure freer trade is 
now possible in the United Stateo,and that the Oanadians would 
not long hold out : ~g/l,inst the offer of terms eo deeireable 
t'rom an economic point of view. Our final concluBion,then,is 
that freer trade relatione between the United ~tatea and 
n 
Canada are highly deBireable,~nd poeAlble of nttaiment. 
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